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1 Introduction
As a response to the social impacts of major
disasters of the 1980s and 1990s (Bhopal,
Chernobyl, the BSE crisis and more), academic
engagement with the challenges of measuring and
managing risk flourished. The fact that these new
risks had been created, rather than controlled, by
science and technology caused many to question
the privileged position that ‘expert’ knowledge
held as the lone safeguard of society (Adam, Beck
and van Loon 2000). The paradox of science and
technology as both risk and safeguard is apparent
across a number of sectors today, but particularly
within agriculture where modern biotechnologies
are increasingly heralded as a response to the
risks associated with a changing climate. In
reality, the particular combination of risks and
benefits presented by climatic change and by new
agricultural technologies are differently perceived
and experienced by different stakeholders in the
future of agriculture.
This article offers reflection and insight from an
attempt to study the creation, perception and
experience of risk in the context of smallholder
farming in Kenya, where this technological
approach to agricultural climate change
adaptation is increasingly gaining financial and
policy support. It focuses on the multiple ways in
which risk is introduced and experienced (e.g.
through climate change threats to livelihoods or
the development of new agricultural
biotechnologies) by different actors, from
smallholder farmers to international
biotechnology development projects, within this
context. The research findings highlight the
importance of history, knowledge, social and
institutional settings, trust and politics in
shaping the ways that risks are created,
perceived and experienced by these different
actors. It is demonstrated that in order to fully
appreciate what risk is it is necessary to both
broaden disciplinary scope and narrow
geographic focus, replacing universal theories
with locally appropriate and historically and
socially embedded understandings of risk.
The article begins with an introduction to the
concept of the social construction of risk as a
theoretical foundation for the research. It
describes the methodological approach and some
of the key findings, and concludes with a
reflection on, and a discussion of, the importance
and challenges of studying multifaceted risks.
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Abstract Studying multifaceted risks that are simultaneously and differently perceived and experienced
presents significant challenges, but gaining insight into multiple realities and rationalities is crucial for
achieving effective and collaborative governance. This article describes the challenges of a recent study that
looked at how different actors, ranging from smallholder farmers to international biotechnology development
projects, weigh up the risks associated with the uncertain future of maize agriculture in Kenya. It presents
personal reflections on a 12-month experience of applying a multi-sited, ethnographic research approach in
Kenya and the UK, in an attempt to observe the creation, perception and experience of risks. The article
demonstrates the importance of history, knowledge, social and institutional settings, trust and politics in the
ways that risks are created, perceived and experienced by these different actors, and argues for the necessity
of engaging with these highly contextualised processes at individual, local and institutional levels.
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2 Background: tracing a complex trajectory in
risk studies
In response to the picture of society painted by
Giddens (1990) and Beck (1992), as one which
has become concerned, above all else, with the
regulation of technologically created, trans-
boundary and uncontrollable risks, academic
work in the 1990s produced a dense and complex
body of literature which theorised at length
about the limitations of knowledge and the
legitimacy of risk-regulating protocols and
institutions (Adam 1996; Funtowicz and Ravetz
1994; Hinchliffe 2001; Jasanoff 1999; Shrader-
Frechette 1996; Wynne 1992, 1996).
Whitfield Weighing Up the Risks: The Challenge of Studying ‘Risk’ in Empirical Research8
Table 1 Description of methods, data collection and key questions addressed in the research
Phase Stakeholder Methodological approach Data collection Key questions
group
1 Climate Assumption mapping z 16 structured interviews z How are climate change 
scientists and Akin to a small-scale were conducted with  risks constructed through 
crop modellers value-chain analysis in academics at the UK and climate and crop modelling?
which the climate or crop Kenya Meteorological z Where does uncertainty (and 
model is the product and Departments, CGIAR ambiguity and ignorance) 
‘uncertainty’ replaces ‘value’ institutions, and the Kenya originate and where is it 
as the focus of interest, Agricultural Research hidden in projections of
such that the points in the Institution’s Climate future crops/climates?
product-cycle of the climate Change Unit z How is uncertainty (and 
or crop model at which z Systematic review of ambiguity and ignorance) in 
uncertainty accumulates (and climate/crop modelling modelling communicated 
where it enters and ‘leaves’ literature across the modelling 
the chain) can be identified. z Secondary data from process/beyond it?
2010 meta-analysis survey 
of crop modellers conducted
by the CCAFS group of the 
CGIAR
2 Water Institutional ethnography z Visits to Kenya Agricultural z How is the WEMA pathway 
Efficient Involves attending and Research Institute; CIMMYT; framed in relation to 
Maize for observing all aspects of Monsanto alternative pathways of
Africa project work that is conducted z 18 semi-structured interviews change?
partners within an institution, tracing z 3 visits to breeding stations z How are evidences and 
the social connections, z Analysis of project knowledges (re)produced 
operations, regimes, ‘ruling documents and literature within WEMA?
relations’, discourses, and zObservation of WEMA z What knowledges and 
values that structure and partners at agricultural shows, evidences justify the WEMA 
drive that organisation Open Forum on Agricultural narrative of change (and 
(Devault 2006; Lewis 1998; Biotechnology meetings, and which knowledges and 
M’charek 2005; Smith 2005). the National Biosafety evidences are ignored)?
Conference
3 Smallholder Participatory scenario zObservations of farming zHow are livelihood risks/ 
farmers development practices in Nyando/Nandi uncertainties/opportunities 
(Nyando/Nandi Participatory scenario and Makueni districts perceived, experienced and 
and Makueni development (Enfors et al. zSemi-structured interviews adapted to?
districts) 2008; Kok, Biggs, and Zurek with 46 farmers zWhat future pathways are 
2007; Patel, Kok and z6 participatory scenario envisaged in relation to a 
Rothman 2007) workshops workshops changing and uncertain 
bring smallholders together zSecondary data – 280 climate?
and engage them in the task household survey 
of developing, analysing and questionnaires
comparing qualitative storylines
about future land use.
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The information deficit model, which represented
the dominant paradigm within the ‘public
understanding of science’ (PUS) studies of the
1980s, was driven by a belief that observed
differences between the ‘perceptions’ of the lay
public and the ‘objective findings’ of scientists
were the product of a lack of understanding
about, or lack of effective dissemination of,
scientific processes and results within the wider
society (Royal Society 1983). However, discontent
with deterministic assumptions, coupled with
public distrust of the institutions charged with
identifying and regulating risks (Owens 2000;
Slovic 1999; Wynne 1996), led to the development
of alternative theories to explain the continued
disparity between scientific fact and public
perception (Irwin and Wynne 1996; Slovic 2000).
Through the 1990s, a large body of literature
emerged that highlighted the value judgements
and subjective decision-making involved in
framing ‘scientific problems’ (particularly those
which presuppose societal objectives), selecting
methodological approaches, and interpreting
results (Hinchliffe 2001; Shrader-Frechette
1995). The objectivity of science was increasingly
challenged by arguments about the constructed
nature of knowledge, and the ambiguous nature
of complex real-world change and, as a
consequence, it was increasingly recognised that
the contextualised knowledge of ‘non-experts’,
developed through real experience of societal
behaviour and values, is an important source of
information about the realities of risk (Beck
1992; Jasanoff 1999; Wynne 1996).
Douglas and Wildavsky’s (1982) theory that
alternative interpretations and acceptabilities of
risk are the product of personal cultural traits,
which often reflect social structures, has
underpinned studies that have attempted to show
that the culture of scientific institutions is
different from that of a general public or a local
farmer (Finucane 2002; Finucane and Holup
2005) and, furthermore, that social interactions
reinforce cultural barriers (Herring 2007; Lomax
2000; Priest, Bonfadelli, and Rusanen 2003) and
‘amplify’ risks (Kasperson et al. 1988). In relation
to understandings of risk, an extensive body of
literature considers the ways in which cultural
barriers are strengthened through the
development of public distrust of regulating
institutions (Lomax 2000; Priest 2001; Renn et al.
1992; Renn and Levine 1991). Lash and Wynne
(1992) argue, along with a large body of more
recent sociology literature (Finucane and Holup
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Table 1 Description of methods, data collection and key questions addressed in the research (cont.)
Phase Stakeholder Methodological approach Data collection Key questions
group
4 Actors within Narrative policy analysis z5 semi-structured interviews zWhat alternative 
Kenyan Identification of narratives with members of the understandings of
biosafety and discourse within policy National Biosafety Authority biotechnology risks/ 
regulation documents, statements and (NBA) and the KARI uncertainties/(ambiguities/ 
speeches in order to identify Institutional Biosafety ignorances)/opportunities 
‘the ways in which Committee contribute to the biosafety 
practitioners, bureaucrats, zA review of policy debate in Kenya?
and policymakers articulate documents and peer- zWhose narratives are being 
and make sense of complex reviewed literature formalised within 
realities’ (Roe 1994: 35). This (including within the NBA biotechnology legislation/ 
approach is used to archives) regulatory frameworks?
characterise the scenarios z3 interviews with academic
and arguments that frame experts on Kenyan Biosafety 
regulatory discourse in politics
Kenya. z4 semi-structured interviews 
with pro- and anti-GM lobby 
organisations (2 each)
zAttendance at National 
Biosafety Conference and 
Open Forum on Agricultural 
Biotechnology meetings
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2005; Hinchliffe 2001; Irwin 2001; Irwin and
Michael 2003; Pellizzoni 2010; Stirling 2003), that
it is in these barriers and social and cultural
practices that risks are socially constructed.
The challenges of studying risk, then, are clearly
evident. Risks are differently created, amplified,
perceived and experienced by different people in
different social, cultural and institutional
settings. Difficult questions arise about how to
conceptualise, interpret and govern issues
around which knowledge is not only incomplete,
but simultaneously exists both in real-world
observation and internally in the culture,
experience and values of individuals (Horlick-
Jones 1998; Slovic 1999). This article focuses on
addressing some of these difficult questions,
particularly about conceptualisation and
interpretation.
3 The challenges of putting a complex concept in
to practice: reflections on fieldwork
This complex concept of socially constructed and
multifaceted risk was adopted within a 12-month
period of fieldwork which aimed to understand
the ways in which a whole range of actors with a
stake in the future of maize agriculture in Kenya
– smallholder farmers, crop breeders,
biotechnology regulators, climate scientists –
frame the future. The research was designed
particularly in response to the recognition that
across sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), technological
responses to climate change are increasingly
being heralded, largely by influential actors
within a growing public–private sector, as the
solutions to a risky and complex problem; but
also that such technological futures are often not
risk-free themselves and they coexist with
multiple alternative ‘pathways to
sustainability’(Leach, Scoones and Stirling
2007). The opening up and ongoing definition of
biotechnology regulation (both in Kenya and
across SSA), the changing climate, the unstable
food prices and markets, and the growing
political concern with food security and rural
livelihoods, all contribute to a highly uncertain
future around which there is a plurality of risk
constructions.
The Water Efficient Maize for Africa (WEMA)
initiative in Kenya – a public–private initiative
that seeks to develop and disseminate genetically
engineered drought-tolerant maize to
‘vulnerable’ smallholder farmers in order to
improve their resilience to the coupled risks of
drought and climate change – was the central
case study of the research and a combination of
participatory and ethnographic research
methods were applied in engaging with WEMA
institutions, international agricultural research
institutions, climate-crop modelling institutions,
smallholder farmers from two of Kenya’s maize
growing districts (with opposing dominant agro-
ecological conditions), and biosafety regulatory
policymakers.
A multi-sited approach was adopted, with the
aim of engaging with the connections and points
of departure between multiple stakeholders,
multiple constructions of risk, and multiple
pathways. The research was organised into four
phases, each primarily focused on a different
stakeholder group and adopting methods that
directly targeted information in response to
stakeholder-specific questions. These phases are
detailed in Table 1, which includes information
about the stakeholder target group, the research
methods applied, and the key questions being
addressed.
Some of the findings about the contextualised
processes by which risks are created, perceived
and experienced amongst each of these
stakeholder groups are presented below.
Through this summary, the fundamental role of
contextualised histories, knowledges, politics,
priorities, social interactions and trust, in
shaping multifaceted risk becomes evident.
3.1 Climate-crop modelling
Within climate-crop modelling, the projections of
which increasingly provide the evidence base for
the agricultural development work of the
Consultative Group on International Agricultural
Research (CGIAR), there is an extensive and
growing global community of contributing
scientists. Within this community, this research
found a tension between a ‘complexity logic’ in
the construction of Kenya’s agro-climatic future –
which equates increasing model resolutions,
parameters and model ensembles with increasing
proximity to reality and by extension (through an
evidence-based policy logic) to better informed
policy – and warnings, that actually come from
within the modelling community itself, against
both objectivist interpretations of modelling
outputs and the privileging of science as the sole
constructor of this future:
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The recent disagreements in the literature
(like differences between David Lobell and
Chris Funk) about the directions and even
model reliability for East Africa suggest to me
that we need to implement adaptation
strategies for moderately severe cases even if
we don’t know the exact changes to plan for.
The models aren’t very good at predicting
trends yet. Because of this shortfall, we should
be focusing on getting better observations
(field size, maize varieties in use, nexrad
[Next Generation Radar] rainfall estimates).
The observations would do two things: provide
better data to farmers, and provide better
data for model calibration. (Email
correspondence with a US climate scientist,
January 2012)
This statement offered by a key climate science
informant highlights some of the challenges of
using climate impact projections in the light of
incomplete knowledge. It is evident in the way
that the informant struggles between a
realisation of the weaknesses of models’
predictions – ‘the models aren’t very good at
predicting trends yet’ – and the need for some
kind of projection guidelines – ‘we need to
implement adaptation strategies for moderately
severe cases’. This challenge is not uncommon,
and its resolution all too often depends on a
particular framing of the knowledge gap, in
which it is reduced to a probability distribution
and, where projections are divergent, the average
of a set of models becomes akin to the most
likely change. This closing down of incomplete
knowledge to over-simplified probability
distributions is a cultural convention within the
modelling community.
However, the seemingly infinite endeavour
towards increasing model complexity in order to
narrow probability distributions, is also being
countered by an emerging convention, within the
same community, that recognises that there is an
extent to which agro-climatic futures are not just
unknown, but are unknowable and, as such, there
are limits to the justifiability of seeking ever
greater model complexity:
The community would, I believe, greatly
benefit from moving away from ‘black box’
thinking, whereby crop science knowledge is
believed to be contained within models.
(CCAFS crop modellers’ survey response)
There is the beginning of a backlash – a
favouring of simpler and participatory modelling
approaches – and particularly a recognition that
models are not simply predictive machines, but
rather are useful tools for contributing towards
particular policy questions, and that they should
be designed as such. It is clear, however, that
constructions of future risk that are bounded
within climate-crop models are shaped by the
scientific conventions of the discipline, as well as
by a political motivation of defending and
legitimising that discipline, and the expertise of
modellers.
3.2 The Water Efficient Maize for Africa Initiative
The story of agricultural change advanced within
the official communications and reports of the
WEMA initiative is of a ‘pro-poor’ technological
solution to problems of poverty and food
insecurity that are largely ecologically and
climatically driven. Such a narrative is evident in
the following statements, which are taken
directly from a WEMA policy brief:
Persistent incidences of drought in Kenya
have continued to threaten the food security
situation and subjected millions of Kenyans to
starvation… Modern biotechnology provides a
major opportunity to address perpetual maize
shortages that are now being compounded by
new threats triggered by climate change…
WEMA was launched as a demand driven
technological innovation designed to
strengthen the resilience and adaptive
capacity of maize farmers to cope with
drought… Stable and reliable yields will
revitalise and build the confidence of farmers
in maize production. Stability in yields will
give farmers the confidence to invest in other
productivity enhancing technologies such as
sustainable soil management practices… It is
projected that maize varieties to be developed
could increase yields by 25 percent compared
to current varieties. This increase would
translate into about two million additional
tonnes of food during drought years…
Policymakers within the relevant government
institutions and agencies should create an
enabling environment and make science-
based decisions that will facilitate the conduct
of confined field trials and other biosafety
regulatory steps that will eventually lead to
commercialisation of WEMA seed varieties
(WEMA 2010b).
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It is within the changing nature of the ‘global
public goods’ mandate of the CGIAR; the
resource limitations of the Kenya Agricultural
Research Institute (KARI; one of the WEMA
partners); the history and trajectory of research
and development in crop breeding; the ‘impact-
at-scale’ targets of philanthropic donors; and the
commercial interests, business culture and
charitable participation of private partners that
this WEMA narrative fits, comfortably at points
but not so at others.
The approach to crop breeding and social impact
assessment within the WEMA initiative is
particularly shaped by the institutional and
political context from which it has been forged
and within which it operates. In adhering to the
business-mindedness, state-of-the-art, and
impact-at-scale priorities of Monsanto and of the
Gates Foundation, WEMA science is geared
towards the generation of particular evidences.
Crop breeding within CIMMYT (International
Maize and Wheat Improvement Center, Mexico)
has shifted to a focus on optimal rather than
appropriate technology development; crop trials
take place in ‘mega-environments’ that
represent vast expanses of similar agro-ecologies
and essentially deny local social, cultural,
economic and political geographies; and
socioeconomic impact assessments focus on
identifying the barriers to technology
dissemination rather than identifying farmer
needs and preferences. Within CIMMYT there is
a team of frustrated social scientists, one of
whom this quote comes from:
The socioeconomic research is rich and
detailed but can be sometimes peripheral to
the breeding projects. (CGIAR interview, June
2012)
The WEMA case study, then, is an example of the
ways that apparently science-based framings of
the future are shaped by institutional and political
priorities – and the evidence that legitimises this
framing is actually generated within a scientific
process that rather than being objective, closes
down knowledge gaps through its assumptions
and values and is geared towards these priorities.
3.3 Smallholder farmers
Participatory research with smallholder farmers
revealed a history of experiences of interactions
between farmers and external interventions,
projects, policies and information. Experiences
ranged from adopting ultimately unsuccessful
farming practices on the basis of incomplete
advice by agricultural extension workers, to
purchasing fake seed through corrupt seed supply
systems. As a result of these often negative
experiences, barriers of distrust were created
between farmers and external interventions,
leading to an internalisation of risk.
In response to uncertainty, rather than being
dependent on external advice and information,
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Table 2 Summary of evaluation of three broad pathways, and one sub-pathway, of change in maize farming
Change pathways Nandi/Nyando Makueni
Time Critical future scenario Time Critical future scenario
horizon horizon
Changing land Near term zRising input costs Very near zClimate-related crop failures
management, zClimate-related crop failures term z Information/training
preparation and inputs zEvidence/experience of success
Adopting varieties and Near term zClimate-related crop failures Long term zAvailability and accessibility
technologies zEvidence/experience of success zEvidence/experience of success
z Financial resources
Adopting GM maize Very long zEvidence/experience of success Very long z Information
term z Information term zAvailability and accessibility
zFavourable regulation zEvidence/experience of success
z Favourable regulation
Alternatives to maize Long term zFinancial resources Long term z Financial resources
for market and home z Information zEvidence/experience of success
consumption zEvidence/experience of success zClimate-related crop failures
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farmers depend on their own experimentations,
indicators and experiences to make judgements
about opportunities and risk. Examples from this
research include farmers conducting trials of
different planting and land preparation
strategies on small plots within their compound,
and farmer preferences for using local indicators
of weather, rather than weather forecasts, to
make judgements about planting and harvesting.
As seen in the recent history of agricultural
change in the two districts, the scenarios broadly
revealed that incremental, reversible and low
input cost pathways – changes that farmers could
trial for themselves before adopting whole scale
– such as changes in land preparation and
planting times or the adoption of water
conservation techniques, are seen as the most
viable in the near term (see Table 2).
More radical changes that require investment in
new technologies or changes to crop
compositions were seen as potential longer term
pathways contingent on significant changes in
financial and resource capacity and on evidence
of success. Such pathways are often less
amenable to incremental adoption or farmer
experimentation, so make farmers dependent on
the accuracy of external information and advice,
and they may see farmers having to engage with
new markets and actors. As such they necessarily
introduce new uncertainties, not defined by
climates, but by social relations. The adoption of
GM varieties is a prime example because it is
likely to bring farmers into contact with new sets
of regulations and new chains of seed supply and
post-harvest processing, systems in which there
is already little trust.
3.4 Biosafety regulation
Research into the recent history of biosafety
regulatory policymaking shows how different
framings of a technological future, and
particularly different constructions of social risks
and benefits, have competed in a highly
contested and long running political debate
around the drafting and establishment of the
Kenyan Biosafety Act, and more recently over
the establishment of regulations for labelling
genetically modified foods. This can be
characterised as a highly polarised political
debate. Framings of a technological future of
social benefits (which are linked to arguments
that regulation should facilitate the promotion of
the technology) sit in direct opposition to
framings of a technological future of social risk
(and arguments that a precautionary regulation
should prioritise social protection). From a
pro-GM perspective this debate is often
characterised as a science-based approach to
regulation versus a value-based approach to
regulation, as though the safety of GMOs has
been unequivocally and objectively proven, and
so taking a precautionary stance is unscientific.
In the case of the Biosafety Act, this discourse
was fairly well sustained, and it resulted in an
Act that was drafted by experts and largely
unchanged across a four-year period of very weak
‘public consultation’. An outline of obligations
for considering the socioeconomic impacts of the
technology within the Act were lobbied for by
civil society organisations, but were largely kept
out of the Act, for example. The International
Food Policy Research Institute published a
number of policy notes and guidelines on this
subject, and though careful not to reject
socioeconomic assessment in principle, these
documents often present one-sided warnings
about the costs, challenges and negative
implications of adopting such assessments, whilst
at the same time using the opportunity
presented by a discussion of socioeconomics to
emphasise the socioeconomic benefits of
biotechnology:
Inclusion of socioeconomic considerations may
render a biosafety regulatory process a
nonfunctional process if it becomes an
insurmountable regulatory hurdle…
Unreasonable regulatory delays or uncertainty
can affect negatively the stream of societal
benefits derived from the adoption of GE
crops as developers tend to invest less in such
environments or shift to non-regulated
technologies. (Falck-Zepeda and Zambrano
2011: 189–92)
By effectively establishing the need for ‘science-
based’ regulation early in the process of
designing a regulatory framework, a group of
politically influential scientists made themselves
both indispensable and unchallengeable. Value-
based concerns about the implications of the
Biosafety Bill, or the suggestion of social risks by
the anti-GMO lobby could readily be dismissed
as not science-based and therefore not relevant
to regulation. (Interview, Kenya Organic
Agriculture Network)
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However, the more recent regulations for labelling
GMO foods, which has adopted quite strict
testing, tracing, and labelling requirements, and
even more significantly the Ministry of Public
Health’s ban on the importation of GMO foods,
have really challenged the expert monopolisation
of risk assessment and have actually been much
more oriented towards the implementation of
precautionary measures.
There is an increasingly dominant, technology-
focused framing of a ‘green revolution’ future
within agricultural policy and research in Kenya
and in sub-Saharan Africa more broadly. These
case studies suggest that the incomplete
knowledge, values and assumptions that underpin
this framing (whether in the production of model
projections of agro-climatic change or knowledge
about the performance and appropriateness of
new maize varieties) easily become lost within an
evidence base that reinforces expert ownership
over knowledge. However, this incompleteness of
knowledge might resurface when it is directly
experienced by smallholder farmers (for example
when they act on inaccurate weather forecasts
that have been presented as certain, or when they
adopt a technology that doesn’t achieve the
benefits that it promised). These negative
interactions can lead to barriers of distrust being
created and risks internalised and can even be
the basis for constructions of risk in cases where,
for example, adopting a technology is risky
because it means becoming dependent on
untrusted external actors.
These social barriers can result in entrenched
positions that themselves create polarised
framings of the future, as seen in the biosafety
debate, and the case of labelling regulations or
the ban on importation of GM foods are
examples of how the framings of the scientific
community cannot necessarily win out by sticking
within their trench and making claims about the
authority or objectivity of their evidence.
4 Discussion
The complexity of the concept of risk that has
emerged from the literature of the past decade
or so, coupled with reflections on applying this
complex concept, suggest that the key to
approaching risk might just be to theorise less
and contextualise more. As a product of
histories, social interactions, knowledge gaps and
politics, risk manifests differently in different
contexts and in the different understandings,
experiences and constructions of different actors.
Understanding the processes through which risks
are created, perceived and experienced by
different actors requires an approach that can
interrogate a history of social interactions and
experiences, the origins of assumptions and
values, politics and priorities, and trust.
Processes of decision-making are often
multilayered and build on a history of assumption-
laden experimentation and conclusions; this is
particularly the case, for example, in climate
modelling, in which there is such a huge
production chain of scientific experimentation
that assumptions inevitably get lost within the
process, but is similarly true of smallholder
farmers who are engaged in their own
experimentations and make decisions on the basis
of their own evidence, values, priorities, and trust.
Appropriate methods for observing and
understanding the complex processes by which
risks are created, perceived and experienced
requires methods that are tailored to the
particular contexts of the study, but should be
designed to engage ethnographically with micro-
scale interactions as well as to understand
broader political processes and pressures, and
should combine a study of contemporary
processes with a retrospective look at how they
have evolved and accumulated through (at least
recent) history.
In this research, retrospective and real-time
observation of decision-making proved to be a
much more insightful way of unpacking the
process than simply asking questions. Although
asking farmers how they make decisions about
which varieties of maize to plant revealed that it
was a decision-making process that involved
many factors, for example, these factors could
not easily be articulated by farmers that are used
to ‘just do[ing] it’.1 Because farmers participate
in a much less formalised process of decision-
making than does a climate or crop scientist, for
example, the accumulation of experiences and
experiments that contribute to this process are
internal and even subconscious (as opposed to
being laid out in peer-reviewed scientific papers).
It proved much more useful to have the farmers
participate in an exercise in which they weighted
the relative importance of a range of different
factors (inclusive of phenological properties of
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maize but also price, supply, etc.) and have them
explain their weightings in order to simulate a
decision-making process.
In the case of climate modelling or crop
breeding, there might be peer-reviewed
documentation of processes and so assumptions
can be traced retrospectively through a
systematic review of literature. However, it is
important to be aware that the findings of
experiments often become translated into
certain truths through their citation and
recitation across long paper trails, with the
consequence that attempting to trace
assumptions can be an arduous process. An
attempt to discover the assumptions
underpinning the much made claims that ‘the
maize varieties developed under WEMA are
expected to increase yields by 25 per cent under
moderate drought’ (WEMA 2010a), by following
a string of citations, eventually determined that
it was based on experimental research conducted
by Monsanto in which a number of trials of
transgenic CspB event maize (compared with its
conventional hybrid) were conducted under
water limited conditions (no rainfall for a span of
10–14 days immediately prior to flowering) in
the American Midwest. Confusingly, however,
although the data presented in these studies
showed that experimental transgenic yields were
higher, they did not indicate the 25 per cent
growth suggested by WEMA, so whilst it had
appeared to be an evidence-based claim,
supported by peer-reviewed citations, it turned
out to be almost entirely assumption-based.
Furthermore, looking not just to processes that
take place within stakeholder groups or contexts,
but to how these are shaped by connections and
disconnections between groups –
communications, trust, and political dynamics –
is also critical for understanding multifaceted
risks. Again, actual observation of information or
knowledge exchanges can provide much more
insight into how information is received, trusted
and interpreted than simply asking for
recollections in interviews. Within this research
a number of attempts were made to simulate
information exchanges, including the
presentation of information about GM crops to
farmers. The responses to information in these
cases said a lot about the extent to which they
were trusted and accepted. Claims about the
potential benefits of the technology were often
met with a lot of interest, but also a degree of
scepticism. Questions were raised about the cost
of the technology, the potential health risks and
even the strength of the evidence about the
benefits of the technology. However, it is again
important to be aware that the extent to which
information is trusted may not be immediately
obvious within this exchange. Initial responses to
information often reflected levels of interest
more than willingness to act on the information.
The scale and overlapping nature of knowledge
networks that contribute to individual’s
constructions of risk, mean that to observe and
understand the full process by which risks are
constructed is an incredibly difficult undertaking.
The production chain of a climate–crop model,
for example, is so vast and involves so many
different actors, that to fully trace it would
require a massive investment of time and energy.
The same is true of understanding the risk
constructions of an individual farmer, in this case
requiring a study capable of capturing the
historical interactions and experiences through
which knowledges are developed and trust in
others is built and eroded.
Such approaches to research will undoubtedly
have challenges, but the insight into the origins,
perceptions and experiences of multiple risks
associated with future change will be invaluable
for achieving effective and collaborative
development in agriculture as well as other
sectors.
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